Suchergebnisse

Signed (p. 34 and 49): George L. Hatheway, Benj. R. Stevenson, Wm. Wedderburn. ; Dated (p. 49): "Fredericton, New Brunswick, October, 1871." ; Cover title. ; Electronic reproduction. ; Mode of access: Internet. ; 44

Tables. ; Some text in double columns. ; Cover title: British Columbia's claim for better terms. ; Electronic reproduction. ; Mode of access: Internet. ; 44

This article presents a qualitative, descriptive study of how registered nurses (RNs) (N=33) in leadership roles in institutional, long-term care settings delegate care. Findings from this study include both the strategies and processes these nurses used for delegating care and also their perceptions of barriers to effective delegation and potential benefits of delegation. Nurses reported two key approaches to delegation, including the "follow the job description" approach, which emphasized adherence to facility-level roles and job descriptions, and the "consider the scope of practice" approach, which emphasized consideration of multiple aspects of scope of practice and licensure along with the context of care. While the former approach resulted in more clarity and certainty for the RN, the latter facilitated a focus on quality of resident-care outcomes as linked to the delegation process. Perceived barriers to effective delegation were comparable among RNs using either approach to delegation, and almost all RNs could describe benefits of delegation for long-term care. Future directions regarding delegation in long-term care settings are disclosed.

In double columns. ; Cover title. ; "[Speech of the Hon. R. McBride, Premier, in Legislature, reprinted from the News-Advertiser, February 15th, 1912]" ; Edwards & Lort, ; Electronic reproduction. ; Mode of access: Internet. ; 44

AbstractThe process by which countries accede to the World Trade Organization (WTO) has become the subject of considerable debate. This article takes a closer look at what determines the concessions the institution requires of an entrant. In other words, who gets a good deal, and who does not? I argue that given the institutional design of accession proceedings and the resulting suspension of reciprocity, accession terms are driven by the domestic export interests of existing members. As a result, relatively greater liberalization will be imposed on those entrants that have more valuable market access to offer upon accession, something that appears to be in opposition to expectations during multilateral trade rounds, where market access functions as a bargaining chit. The empirical evidence supports these assertions. Looking at eighteen recent entrants at the six-digit product level, I find that controlling for a host of country-specific variables, as well as the applied protection rates on a given product prior to accession, the more a country has to offer, the more it is required to give. Moreover, I show how more democratic countries, in spite of their greater overall depth of integration, exhibit greater resistance to adjustment in key industries than do nondemocracies. Finally, I demonstrate that wealth exhibits a curvilinear effect. On the one hand, institutionalized norms lead members to exercise observable restraint vis-à-vis the poorest countries. On the other hand, the richest countries have the greatest bargaining expertise, and thus obtain better terms. The outcome, as I show using a semi-parametric analysis, is that middle-income countries end up with the most stringent terms, and have to make the greatest relative adjustments to their trade regimes.

In view of the stalled situation in climate change lawmaking, transferring the focus from direct congressional lawmaking to the possibility of delegated lawmaking by agencies may provide a new perspective to break the gridlock of federal carbon tax legislation. Taxes, however, in practice are generally less delegable than environmental and other regulations. Specifically, the Internal Revenue Service and Treasury are not permitted to determine tax rates. This is also the case for environmental taxes in the Internal Revenue Code. Though some environmental statutes seem to provide some implied and untested delegation of power to regulate by taxation, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has not yet imposed any environmental taxes under such delegation. This Article argues for expanding the delegation of environmental taxes to realize their regulatory purposes, and proposes to delegate the EPA the power to determine and adjust carbon tax rates. A comparative study shows that Chinese legislature has considered the regulatory purpose in expanding the delegation of tax rates and tax base in the new Environmental Protection Tax Law, which provides a valuable reference to the U.S. Delegating the power to determine carbon taxes rates advances the EPA's regulatory mission due to its comparative advantages of expertise in environmental policymaking, flexibility to the uncertainty and volatility of the climate change issue, as well as coordination of environmental policy instruments. The regulatory nature of environmental taxes also weakens the distributional and transfer-of-property concern and thus justifies the legitimacy of environmental tax delegation. Moreover, the EPA is likely to be more responsible than Congress in producing urgently needed but politically unpopular carbon tax. This article concludes that the proposal to delegate carbon tax rates is also likely to pass the constitutional muster based on the Origination Clause and the Non-Delegation Doctrine, as well as potential non-tax-delegation doctrines.

Testimony issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the challenges the baby boom generation and society face in planning for and financing its future long-term care needs, and the role that private long-term care insurance may play in meeting those challenges, focusing on: (1) the increased demand the baby boom generation will likely create for long-term care; (2) an overview of current spending for long-term care of the elderly, including recent changes in Medicaid and Medicare financing of long-term care; and (3) the potential role of private long-term care insurance in helping finance this care, including who buys this insurance, its affordability, and the critical need for consumer information and protections."

The ability of elected representatives to ensure that output is in line with political priorities is a core element of representative democracy. The article explores how delegation affects politicians' sense of control over the administration, examining delegation practices in Norwegian municipalities and the effects of accountability mechanisms. We find no effects of long-term delegation but negative effects of short-term delegation, indicating that politicians have shorter time horizons than assumed by the NPM notion of strategic political leadership. The negative effects are exacerbated when councillors interact with citizens, suggesting that short-term delegation offers insufficient leeway for politicians when addressing citizen input. ; This work was supported by the Norwegian Ministry of Local Government. ; publishedVersion

Purpose– The purpose of this paper is to examine how the effectiveness of delegation as a management practice is impacted by various factors such as manager cognition, perceived subordinate competence, and cultural differences. This research may help global business leaders to better understand how cultural differences may impact managerial functions and how to manage culturally diverse employees.Design/methodology/approach– This paper is based upon a conceptual discussion of delegation as it has been studied in the past and a reflection on the ways in which past research can usefully inform current trends in the use of delegation as a management practice.Findings– A model is proposed that suggests that the effectiveness of delegation in a local context is a function of the global leader's cognitions and perceptions of their subordinates. Further, it suggests that this relationship is moderated by the local cultural context in that some cultures may be opposed to being delegated authority.Research limitations/implications– This paper presents a conceptual framework and therefore empirical applicability of this model must be proven.Originality/value– Delegation is an under-researched management practice. This paper contributes to the delegation literature by exploring its value to management in a global context.